#### We call this process and methodology Intralocality – This process isn’t and shouldn’t be easy for anyone – the focus on privilege will conjure feelings of guilt and discomfort – we must lean into that discomfort instead of distancing ourselves from that critical moment of reflection – we must take oppression to the level of self-implication. No one asked to be privileged but what we choose to do with that privilege is a choice that must be continually negotiated throughout our lives – Darnall Moore explains that…

(Darnell L. Moore 2011, writer and activist whose work is informed by anti-racist, feminist, queer of color, and anti-colonial thought and advocacy. Darnell's essays, social commentary, poetry, and interviews have appeared in various national and international media venues, including the Feminist Wire, Ebony magazine, and The Huffington Post, "On Location: The “I” in the Intersection," http://thefeministwire.com/2011/12/on-location-the-i-in-the-intersection/)

The most general statement of our politics at the present time would be that we are actively committed to struggling against racial, sexual, heterosexual, and class oppression and see as our particular ask the development of integrated analysis and practice based upon the fact that the major systems of oppression are interlocking. The synthesis of these oppressions creates the conditions of our lives. As black women we see black feminism as the logical political movement to combat the manifold and simultaneous oppressions that all women of color face. -The Combahee River Collective in A Black Feminist Statement Many radical movement builders are well-versed in the theory of intersectionality. Feminists, queer theorists and activists, critical race scholars, progressive activists, and the like owe much to our Black feminist sisters, like The Combahee River Collective, who introduced us to the reality of simultaneity–as a framework for assessing the multitude of interlocking oppressions that impact the lives of women of color–in A Black Feminist Statement (1978). Their voices and politics presaged Kimberlé Crenshaw’s very useful theoretical contribution of “intersectionality” to the feminist toolkit of political interventions in 1989. Since its inception, many have referenced the term—sometimes without attribution to the black feminist intellectual [genealogy](http://thefeministwire.com/2011/12/on-location-the-i-in-the-intersection/) from which it emerged—as a form of en vogue progressive parlance. In fact, it seems to be the case that it is often referenced in progressive circles as a counterfeit license (as in, “I understand the ways that race, sexuality, class, and gender coalesce. I get it. I really do.”) to enter resistance work even if the person who declares to have a deep “understanding” of the connectedness of systemic matrices of oppression, themselves, have yet to discern and address their own complicity in the maintenance of the very oppressions they seek to name and demolish. I am certain that I am not the only person who has heard a person use language embedded with race, class, gender, or ability privilege follow-up with a reference to “intersectionality.” My concern, then, has everything to do with the way that the fashioning of intersectionality as a political framework can lead toward the good work of analyzing ideological and material systems of oppression—as they function “out there”—and away from the great work of critical analyses of the ways in which we, ourselves, can function as actants in the narratives of counter-resistance that we rehearse. In other words, we might be missing the opportunity to read our complicities, our privileges, our accesses, our excesses, our excuses, our modes of oppressing—located “in here”—as they occupy each of us. Crenshaw’s theorization has provided us with a useful lens to assess the problematics of the interrelated, interlocking apparatuses of power and privilege and their resulting epiphenomena of powerlessness and subjugation. Many have focused on the external dimensions of oppression and their material results manifested in the lives of the marginalized, but might our times be asking of us to deeply consider our own “stuff” that might instigate such oppressions? What if we extended Crenshaw’s theory of intersectionality by invoking what we might name “intralocality”? Borrowing from sociologists, the term “social location,” which broadly speaks to one’s context, highlights one’s standpoint(s)—the social spaces where s/he is positioned (i.e. race, class, gender, geographical, etc.). Intralocality, then, is concerned with the social locations that foreground our knowing and experiencing of our world and our relationships to the systems and people within our world. Intralocality is a call to theorize the self in relation to power and privilege, powerlessness and subjugation. It is work that requires the locating of the “I” in the intersection. And while it could be argued that such work is highly individualistic, I contend that it is at the very level of self-in-relation-to-community where communal transformation is made possible. Might it be time to travel into the deep of our contexts? Might it be time for us—theorists/activists—to do the work of intersectionality (macro/system-analysis) in concert with the intra-local (micro/self-focused analysis)? Intersectionality as an analysis, rightly, asks of us to examine systemic oppressions, but in these times of radical and spontaneous insurgencies—times when we should reflect on our need to unoccupy those sites of privilege (where they exist) in our own lives even as we occupy some other sites of domination—work must be done at the level of the self-in-community. We cannot—as a progressive community—rally around notions of “progression” and, yet, be complicit in the very homo/transphobias, racisms, sexisms, ableisms, etc. that violently terrorize the lives of so many others. If a more loving and just community is to be imagined and advanced, it seems to me that we would need to start at a different location than we might’ve expected: self

#### Vote negative to interrupt the mechanisms the 1AC has utilized to prevent the uncomfortable questioning of locating that piece of the oppressor deep inside all of us – Our interruption is key to confronting inequalities within the debate space – vote neg to refuse to avert your gaze from the obvious problems within our activity and to abandon the cognitive dissonance widespread in debate

Perucci explains that (Tony, ssistant Professor of Co mmunication Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, "What the F uck is T hat? The Poetics of Ruptural Performance," Liminalities: A Journal of Performance Studies Vol. 5, No. 3, September 2009)

Recent years have seen a rise in the practice of political street performance. Often called “interventions” or “performance activism,” many of these actions exceed the transparent political messaging of traditional agit - prop performance. Rather, they mobilize the particular qualities of performance as embodied action — what I call “ruptural performance” — as a modality in opposition to the stultifying effects of the society of the sp ectacle. Drawing on Brechtian aesthetics and the Artaudian embodiment of “the poetic state” as well as the (a)logic of Dada and the materialism of Minimal Art, **ruptural performance enacts interruption, event, confrontation and bafflement as a form of direct action**. “ Every day, do something that won’t compute” — Wendell Berry, The Mad Farmer’s Manifesto 1 Much of today’s activism emerges out of an experience of the totality, of the intractability and intransigence of consumer culture, and of what Guy Deb ord once called “the society of the spectacle.” It is an aesthetic response to a political/cultural crisis, not to mention an ecological, psychic and economic one. This essay addresses what is particular to the performance of what are variously called “interventions” and “performance activism.” These actions’ characteristics as performance work in ways that are specific to their form and exceed any “message” or content that they might (or might not) seek to convey. The conditions of inequity and ecological disaster that are intrinsic to consumer culture are now an open secret – or not even a secret but an accepted fact of life. Perhaps this is even truer now in the face of what has been named “the current economic crisis,” which spurs the call to “drill baby drill” and sends Wal - Mart sales through the roof while the rest of the economy collapses. Ecological crisis and sweatshop labor are no longer concerns that we think we can afford to address in daily life. In the face of such conditions, Jacques Rancière points out the challenge of what he calls the dilemma of “critical art” thusly: “understanding alone can do little to transform consciousness and situations. The exploited have rarely had the need to have the laws of exploitation explained to them. Because it’s not a misunderstanding of the existing state of affairs that nurtures the submission of the oppressed, but a lack of confidence in their own capacity to transform it” (83). In what follows, I argue for and trace out the critical characteristics of this insurgent form of performance activism that I am calling “ruptural performance.” Ruptural performances are distinct less because of a communicated message of their content and more by their qualities as performance: they are interruptive, becoming - event, confrontational, and baffling. Understanding performance as rupture provides a significant way to think about and create interventionist and political performance that places the focus centrally on the act of performance. This emergent genre of performed activism pays a particular debt to the pranksterism of Abbie Hoffman, the d é tournement of the Situationists, and the absurd enactments of Dada performance. These performance interventions are best known today through the practice of culture jamming and by the staged performances of Reverend Billy and the Church of Stop Shopping, The Billionaires for Bush, and the Yes Men. Such interventions, as well as those by lesser - known artists (partly because their strangeness cannot be easily accommodated by media coverage, political activists and academic theorization), can be understood through the notion of “performance as rupture” (Perucci “Guilty” 315 - 329). Rupture itself is not a “new” element in culture, and it certainly has a long legacy in modernism as the bre ach, shift or break. But it has a particular resonance in current activist practices that are both freer and more delimited than previous such enactments. To define performance as rupture, we must articulate what it ruptures. At the risk of constructing a false binary, let me propose that the obverse of “performance as rupture” is Debord’s “spectacle.” Debord explains that while the society of the spectacle is indeed an “accumulation of spectacles ,” ( Society 12) he distinguishes that “The spectacle is not a collection of images; rather it is a social relationship between people that is mediated by images” ( Society 12). While he calls it a “weltanschauung” ( Society 13) it is more than an ideology or a veil of false consciousness. Rather it is “the very heart of society’s real unreality,” ( Society 13) and in that materiality extends the alienation of the production of the commodity to its consumption: the spectacle produces “isolation” through the shift from doing to “contemplation,” where “The spectator’s alienation from and submission to the contemplated object [...] works like this: the more he contemplates, the less he lives” ( Society 23). Ultimately, the spectacle as “social relationship” represents the triumph of the commodity - image, the “ruling order’s ... un interrupted monologue of self - praise” ( Society 19) where “the commodity completes its colonization of social life” ( Society 29). In understanding the spectacle as not merely spectacles, but a modality of experience, in which separation and contemplation fl atten the encounter with presence, Debord proposes “situations” specifically to intervene at the level of the experience. However, in his recent attempt to characterize the new activism, Dream: Re - imagining Progressive Politics in the Age of Fantasy , Steph en Duncombe proposes that spectacle is itself the basis for protest, and that the distinction of the spectacle and the situation is merely “semantic” (130). Instead, he proposes “the ethical spectacle”: **our spectacles will be participatory** , dreams the public can mold and shape themselves. They will be active : spectacles that work only if people help create them. They will be open - ended : setting stages to ask questions and leaving silences to formulate answers. And they will be transparent : dreams that one knows are dreams but which still have the power to attract and inspire. And finally, the spectacles we create will not cover over or replace reality and truth but perform and amplify it. (17, emphasis added) There is much to be gained from Duncombe’s schema tization here. And what I wish to do is revise and amplify it by challenging his dismissal of the distinctive character of “spectacle.” 2 As I have tried to show in my brief summary above, the spectacle is not just a thing to be seen, but is also a mode of performance . Interventionist performance, particularly that which seeks to challenge and disrupt the values and especially the experience of the society of the spectacle, is another modality of enactment rather than a variation of spectacle. While performa nce interventions share with spectacle the qualities of being dramatic and theatrical, what distinguishes them is that they disrupt the experience of daily life, a rupture of the living of social relations — what Reverend Billy of the Church of Stop Shopping calls “the necessary interruption” ( What Should I Do, xiii). The interruption, which Benjamin might call the “sudden start” or the “shock” (163), creates the space for and initiates the experience of a ruptural performance. While bearing in mind the promi sing schema laid out by Duncombe, but also taking into consideration the particular characteristics of the society of the spectacle upon which much “interventionist” work means to engage, I am calling for a proliferation of ruptural performances. Below is an attempt to trace out rupture as a “modality” of performance that means to disrupt, or at least, to fuck with the spectacle. Given Duncombe’s setting of “dreaming the impossible” (158) as a critical element of performance activism, I will introduce my sc hematic be means of an example from a fiction film. The 2004 film, Die Fetten Jahre Sind Vorbei ( The Fat Years are Over , released in the US as The Edukators , d. Weingartner) begins this way: an affluent German family returns to their home to discover a bre ak - in. Their first sign of trouble is a massive tower made of their dining room furniture. They gaze at the sculpture, frozen with bafflement. Nothing, however, has been stolen. But their many commodities have been humiliated: a porcelain bust is hanging f rom a noose, glass figurines are found stuffed in the toilet, the stereo is in the refrigerator, and finally a letter that says “Lesen!” (“Read! ” ). Inside reads the message from the anarchist group that reorganizes the possessions of wealthy residents: “Di e fetten Jarhre sind vorbei.” They stop and stare, confounded. 1. Ruptural performances are interruptive. In some way these performances halt, impede, or delay the habitual practices of daily life. They intervene at the level and in the midst of the quotidian. Such performances engage the “necessary interruption” which seeks to make conscious what is habitual so that it is available for critique. In this way it shares Debord’s notion of the con structed situation — “the concrete construction of temporary settings of life and their transformation into a higher, passionate nature” is inherently interruptive as it “asserts a non - continuous conception of life” (“Report” 48). They seek to destabilize wh at the Russian Formalist Viktor Shklovsky called the “automatism of perception” (13). For Shklovsky, the role of art is to undo “habitualization,” which he says, “devours works, clothes, furniture, one’s wife, and the fear of war” (12). Such a reclamation of perception Shklovsky calls “defamiliarization” (13), for which the Russian phrase is priem ostraneniye , and that translates literally as “making strange.” Brecht realized the political potential for this concept as the Verfremsdungeffekt , which is foundational in that it focuses on the experience of making the familiar strange as much as the transmission of a political message. In the speed - up of a contemporary life characterized by images and simulations, these performances engage what Walter Benjamin c alls the “interruption of happenings” that estranges the “conditions of life” (150). It is this interruption, Benjamin suggests, that allows performance to obtain the “special character [of] ... producing astonishment rather than empathy” (150). Interruptive performance, however, occurs not at the level of representation, but on the field of presence. It is achieved by “putting a frame” around experience (more in John Cage’s than Erving Goffman’s sense) that produces what Richard Bauman calls a “heightened in tensity” or “special enhancement of experience” (43). The Brazilian group, Opovoempé , 3 has performed their Guerrilha Magnética (Magnetic Guerilla) and other intervenções (interventions) throughout public spaces in São Paulo. In 2006, they composed and per formed Congelados (Frozen), a series of intervenções , throughout the city’s supermercados . The performances consisted of simple and improvised ensemble compositions constructed through the use of gesture, repetition, spatial relationship, and kinesthetic r esponse. 4 The piece, in its basic performance of the actions of shopping, defamiliarizes the activities of shopping. The “choreography” that constitutes the “dance and music of buying” only gr adually becomes evident, as the repetition of the banal gestures of shopping begins to mark their strangeness as performance (“Nos Supermercados” Esteves). 5 Though the content of the action is not overtly political (it does not scream its ideology), it ma kes the encounter with shopping, and especially its mindlessness and repetitiveness, seem strange. At its foundation, the pieces are rupture - producing machines : “ The interventions intend to cause rupture of communication barriers, revelation of humor and play, change in the use of public space, and the manifestation of latent contents or social tensions previously unnoticed” ( “What is” Esteves). That rupture is specifically political — particularly in mobilizing the poetic state of quotidian settings. Guerri lha Magnética performances are intended “to break apathy and indifference, to install a creative atmosphere of play and to reveal the poetic content of the city” ( “What is” Esteves). 2. Ruptural performanc es are becoming - events. That is, they do, as Dell Hymes suggests, “breakthrough into performance” (11). And while their boundaries are unstable and unfixed, it is the ruptural performances’ eventness, their status as singular in time and space, which enables the presencing that the spectacle confounds. Alain Baidou puts it this way: “This other time, whose materiality envelops the consequences of the event, deserves the name of a new present. The event is neither past nor future. It makes us present to the present” (39). And yet the instability of the boundaries of the event is equally significant. Ruptural performances tend to confound boundaries of the real and artificial. The actual event of performance is generated by means of artifice, in which audience s often don’t initially realize that they are in a performance. In ruptural performances, audiences often first suspect that something isn’t right, but are not sure if something is amiss. Ultimately, though, the “breakthrough” occurs that things aren’t nor mal, they are strange, and we are in the midst of an event. It is this eventness (and the anticipatory process of becoming event) that enlivens the occasion of the here and now. And that temporal immediacy is captured well by Benjamin’s invocation of Jetzt zeit or the “presence of the now” (261). One becoming - event that has been performed around the world is the “whirl.” The whirl consists of a group of fifteen or more people entering a sweatshop store a few at a time (most often a Wal - Mart, thus the someti mes - used moniker: “Whirl - Mart”) who move empty shopping carts throughout the store. Once all performers are inside and with carts, the participants create a single line of carts that snakes throughout the store, splitting and refiguring as the snake of car ts meets up with blocked aisles and shopping customers (which must look like a Busby Berkley dance sequence to the overhead security cameras). 6 During the hour or more of the performance, if asked by management, security, employees, or customers what they are doing, performers respond kindly with “I’m not shopping.” As performers make their rounds, it is the employees who first encounter the becoming - event, then the customers, then management (who begin manically communicat ing on walkie - talkies), and finally security. When security gets wise, it’s time to return the carts and exit the store. As ruptural performance, the whirl does not make any specific claim on protesting the many things one could advocate against — sweatshop labor, poor treatment of store employees, predatory business practices, etc. ad infinitum — given that all present could recite this litany of wrongs. Rather the whirl enacts the becoming - event of “not shopping,” which in itself can be read as an engagement against over - consumption, Wal - Mart’s imperialism, unfair labor practices, or ecological devastation. 7 3. Ruptural performances are confrontational. By this, I don’t necessarily mean aggressive, though they may be that. Rather, it is as Benjamin puts it, where a “stranger is confronted with the situation as with a startling picture” (151). Ruptural performance is thus distinguished from the “revelatory” performance that unmasks the hidden truths (though it may also do this). In our age, what Marx called the “secret of the commodity” — that its price masked the alienated labor that produced it — is now exposed. We know, for instance, that many of the products we buy are produced by sweatshop, child and slave labor; but we have developed what Adrian Piper calls “ways of averting one’s gaze” (“Ways” 167). Ruptural performance is thus less a critique of ideology or false consciousness, and is more about the experience of the encounter of returning one’s gaze to that which one avoids to maintain acceptance of the inequities of the contemporary social orders. As Husserl notes, “Things are simply there and just need to be seen.” Bruce Wilshire also gets at what I’m talking about when he describes phenomenology as a “systematic effort to unmask the obvious” (11). In fact, this quality is what Michael Fried complained about as the central quality minimal art: its “stage presence” or “theatricality” where “the work refuses, obstinately, to let him alone — which is to say, it refuses to stop confronting him” (140). And in this way, ruptural performance owes as much to Minimalism as it does to Dada. As such it enacts what Fred Moten suggests is not only an “excess of meaning” but also “the anti - interpretive nonreduction of nonmeaning” (197). Ruptural performances, like Minimal Ar t , are characterized by a “concrete thereness,” that Barbara Rose says is a “literal and emphatic assertion of their own existence” (216). As Rosalind Krauss says of Donald Judd’s work, we can say of Ruptural Performance: it “compels and gratifies immediat e sensual gratification” (211)

### 1NC – War Module

#### Crisis-Based Politics –

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Theory that does not investigate address the depth and specificity of the everyday effects of militarism on women. on people living in occupied territories. on members of military institutions. and on the environment. These effects are relevant to feminists in or even notice the omnipresence of militarism cannot represent or a number of ways because military practices and institutions help construct aendered and national identity. and because the.- justify the destruction of natural nonhuman entities and communities during peacetime. Lack of attention to these aspects of the business of making or preventing military violence in an extremely technologized world results in theory that cannot accommodate the connections among the constant presence of militarism, declared wars. and other closely related social phenomena. such as nationalistic glorifications of motherhood. media violence. and current ideological gravitations to military solutions for social problems. Ethical approaches that do not attend to the ways in which warfare and military practices are woven into the very fabric of life in twenty-first century technological states lead to crisis-based politics and analyses. For any feminism that aims to resist oppression and create alternative social and political options. crisis- based ethics and politics are problematic because they distract attention from the need for sustained resistance to the enmeshed. omnipresent systems of domination and oppression that so often function as givens in most people's lives. Neglecting the omnipresence of militarism allows the false belief that the absence of declared armed conflicts is peace. the polar opposite of war. It is particularly easy for those whose lives are shaped by the safety of privilege. and who do not regularly encounter the realities of militarism. to maintain this false belief. The belief that militarism is an ethical, political concern only regarding armed conflict. creates forms of resistance to militarism that are merely exercises in crisis control. Antiwar resistance is then mobilized when the "real" violence finally occurs. or when the stability of privilege is directly threatened. and at that point it is difficult not to respond in ways that make resisters drop all other political priorities. Crisis-driven attention to declarations of war might actually keep resisters complacent about and complicitous in the General presence of global militarism. Seeing war as necessarily embedded in constant military presence draws attention to the fact that horrific. state-sponsored violence is happening nearly all over, all of the time. and that it is perpetrated by military institutions and other militaristic agents of the state

DENIAL IS EVEN WORSE THAN COLORBLINDNESS. CONCERNS ABOUT CLIMATE CHANGE AND GLOBAL WARMING THAT OMIT DISCUSSIONS OF RACE AND RACISM REINFORCE WHITE PRIVILEGE. THIS IS NOT A MERE LINK OF OMISSION, BUT A FORM OF RACIST MARGINALIZING THAT UNDERMINES SURVIVAL

Tim Wise, international lecturer and anti-racist essayist, August 17, 2010

http://www.timwise.org/2010/08/with-friends-like-these-who-needs-glenn-beck-racism-and-white-privilege-on-the-liberal-left/

With Friends Like These, Who Needs Glenn Beck? Racism and White Privilege on the Liberal-Left, acc. 11-9-10, JT

Liberal Colormuteness and the Perpetuation of Racism

But as troubling as colorblindness can be when evinced by liberals, colormuteness may be even worse. Colormuteness comes into play in the way many on the white liberal-left fail to give voice to the connections between a given issue about which they are passionate, and the issue of racism and racial inequity. So, for instance, when environmental activists focus on the harms of pollution to the planet in the abstract, or to non-human species, but largely ignore the day-to-day environmental issues facing people of color, like disproportionate exposure to lead paint, or municipal, medical and toxic waste, they marginalize black and brown folks within the movement, and in so doing, reinforce racial division and inequity. Likewise, when climate change activists focus on the ecological costs of global warming, but fail to discuss the way in which climate change disproportionately affects people of color around the globe, they undermine the ability of the green movement to gain strength, and they reinforce white privilege.

How many climate change activists, for instance, really connect the dots between global warming and racism? Even as people of color are twice as likely as whites to live in the congested communities that experience the most smog and toxic concentration thanks to fossil fuel use? Even as heat waves connected to climate change kill people of color at twice the rate of their white counterparts? Even as agricultural disruptions due to warming — caused disproportionately by the white west — cost African nations $600 billion annually? Even as the contribution to fossil fuel emissions by people of color is 20 percent below that of whites, on average? Sadly, these facts are typically subordinated within climate activism to simple “the world is ending” rhetoric, or predictions (accurate though they may be) that unless emissions are brought under control global warming will eventually kill millions. Fact is, warming is killing a lot of people now, and most of them are black and brown. To build a global movement to roll back the ecological catastrophe facing us, environmentalists and clean energy advocates must connect the dots between planetary destruction and the real lives being destroyed currently, which are disproportionately of color. To do anything less is not only to engage in a form of racist marginalizing of people of color and their concerns, but is to weaken the fight for survival.

#### The 1ac’s description of impending Cyber attacks on US soil serves as a political cover - it justifies OFFENSIVE CYBER OPERATIONS in the first place – it allows US military aggression to go unquestioned and allows the military to infiltrate local resistance groups

Greenwald 13 (Glenn, 1/28, “The Pentagon’s Massive Security Unit is All about offense” <http://www.businessinsider.com/the-pentagons-massive-expansion-of-its-cyber-security-unit-is-all-about-offense-2013-1>”)

As the US government depicts the Defense Department as shrinking due to budgetary constraints, [the Washington Post](http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/pentagon-to-boost-cybersecurity-force/2013/01/19/d87d9dc2-5fec-11e2-b05a-605528f6b712_story.html) this morning announces "a major expansion of [the Pentagon's] cybersecurity force over the next several years, increasing its size more than fivefold." Specifically, says [the New York Times this morning](http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/28/us/pentagon-to-beef-up-cybersecurity-force-to-counter-attacks.html?smid=tw-share), "the expansion would increase the Defense Department's Cyber Command by more than 4,000 people, up from the current 900." The Post describes this expansion as "part of an effort to turn an organization that has focused largely on defensive measures into the equivalent of an Internet-era fighting force." This Cyber Command Unit operates under the command of Gen. Keith Alexander, who also happens to be the head of the National Security Agency, the highly secretive government network that spies on the communications of foreign nationals - and American citizens.¶ The Pentagon's rhetorical justification for this expansion is deeply misleading. Beyond that, these activities pose a wide array of serious threats to internet freedom, privacy, and international law that, as usual, will be conducted with full-scale secrecy and with little to no oversight and accountability. And, as always, there is a small army of private-sector corporations who will benefit most from this expansion.¶ Disguising aggression as "defense"¶Let's begin with the way this so-called "cyber-security" expansion has been marketed. It is part of a sustained campaign which, quite typically, relies on blatant fear-mongering.¶ In March, 2010, the Washington Post published [an amazing Op-Ed](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/25/AR2010022502493.html?sid=ST2010031901063) by Adm. Michael McConnell, Bush's former Director of National Intelligence and a past and current executive with Booz Allen, [a firm representing numerous corporate contractors](http://www.salon.com/2010/03/29/mcconnell_3/) which profit enormously each time the government expands its "cyber-security" activities. McConnell's career over the last two decades - both at Booz, Allen and inside the government - has been devoted to accelerating the merger between the government and private sector in all intelligence, surveillance and national security matters (it was he who led the successful campaign to retroactively immunize the telecom giants for their participation in the illegal NSA domestic spying program). Privatizing government cyber-spying and cyber-warfare is his primary focus now.¶ McConnell's Op-Ed was as alarmist and hysterical as possible. Claiming that "the United States is fighting a cyber-war today, and we are losing", it warned that "chaos would result" from an enemy cyber-attack on US financial systemsand that "our power grids, air and ground transportation, telecommunications, and water-filtration systems are in jeopardy as well." Based on these threats, McConnell advocated that "we" - meaning "the government and the private sector" - "need to develop an early-warning system to monitor cyberspace" and that "we need to reengineer the Internet to make attribution, geolocation, intelligence analysis and impact assessment - who did it, from where, why and what was the result - more manageable." As Wired's Ryan Singel[wrote](http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/03/cyber-war-hype/#ixzz0jZTBbm1b): "He's talking about changing the internet to make everything anyone does on the net traceable and geo-located so the National Security Agency can pinpoint users and their computers for retaliation."¶The same week the Post published McConnell's extraordinary Op-Ed, the Obama White House issued [its own fear-mongering decree](http://www.whitehouse.gov/cybersecurity/comprehensive-national-cybersecurity-initiative) on cyber-threats, depicting the US as a vulnerable victim to cyber-aggression. It began with this sentence: "President Obama has identified cybersecurity as one of the most serious economic and national security challenges we face as a nation, but one that we as a government or as a country are not adequately prepared to counter." It announced that "the Executive Branch was directed to work closely with all key players in US cybersecurity, including state and local governments and the private sector" and to "strengthen public/private partnerships", and specifically announced Obama's intent to "to implement the recommendations of the Cyberspace Policy Review built on the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI) launched by President George W. Bush."¶ Since then, the fear-mongering rhetoric from government officials has relentlessly intensified, all devoted to scaring citizens into believing that the US is at serious risk of cataclysmic cyber-attacks from "aggressors". This all culminated when Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, last October, [warned of what he called](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/12/world/panetta-warns-of-dire-threat-of-cyberattack.html)a "cyber-Pearl Harbor". This "would cause physical destruction and the loss of life, an attack that would paralyze and shock the nation and create a profound new sense of vulnerability." Identifying China, Iran, and terrorist groups, he outlined a parade of horribles scarier than anything since Condoleezza Rice's 2002 Iraqi "mushroom cloud":¶ "An aggressor nation or extremist group could use these kinds of cyber tools to gain control of critical switches. They could derail passenger trains, or even more dangerous, derail passenger trains loaded with lethal chemicals. They could contaminate the water supply in major cities, or shut down the power grid across large parts of the country."¶As usual, though, reality is exactly the opposite. This massive new expenditure of money is not primarily devoted to defending against cyber-aggressors. The US itself is the world's leading cyber-aggressor. A major purpose of this expansion is to strengthen the US's ability to destroy other nations with cyber-attacks. Indeed, even the Post report notes that a major component of this new expansion is to "conduct offensive computer operations against foreign adversaries".¶It is the US - not Iran, Russia or "terror" groups - which already is the first nation (in partnership with Israel) to aggressively deploy a highly sophisticated and extremely dangerous cyber-attack. Last June, the New York Times' David Sanger [reported](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/obama-ordered-wave-of-cyberattacks-against-iran.html?pagewanted=all) what most of the world had already suspected: "From his first months in office, President Obama secretly ordered increasingly sophisticated attacks on the computer systems that run Iran's main nuclear enrichment facilities, significantly expanding America's first sustained use of cyberweapons." In fact, Obama "decided to accelerate the attacks . . . even after an element of the program accidentally became public in the summer of 2010 because of a programming error that allowed it to escape Iran's Natanz plant and sent it around the world on the Internet." According to the Sanger's report, Obama himself understood the significance of the US decision to be the first to use serious and aggressive cyber-warfare:¶ "Mr. Obama, according to participants in the many Situation Room meetings on Olympic Games, was acutely aware that with every attack he was pushing the United States into new territory, much as his predecessors had with the first use of atomic weapons in the 1940s, of intercontinental missiles in the 1950s and of drones in the past decade. He repeatedly expressed concerns that any American acknowledgment that it was using cyberweapons - even under the most careful and limited circumstances - could enable other countries, terrorists or hackers to justify their own attacks."¶ The US isn't the vulnerable victim of cyber-attacks. It's the leading perpetrator of those attacks. As Columbia Professor and cyber expert MishaGlenny[wrote in the NYT last June](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/25/opinion/stuxnet-will-come-back-to-haunt-us.html): Obama's cyber-attack on Iran "marked a significant and dangerous turning point in the gradual militarization of the Internet."¶ Indeed, exactly as Obama knew would happen, revelations that it was the US which became the first country to use cyber-warfare against a sovereign country - just as it was the first to use the atomic bomb and then drones - would make it impossible for it to claim with any credibility (except among its own media and foreign policy community) that it was in a defensive posture when it came to cyber-warfare. As Professor Glenny wrote: "by introducing such pernicious viruses as Stuxnet and Flame, America has severely undermined its moral and political credibility." That's why, as the [Post reported yesterday](http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/fbi-is-increasing-pressure-on-suspects-in-stuxnet-inquiry/2013/01/26/f475095e-6733-11e2-93e1-475791032daf_story.html), the DOJ is engaged in such a frantic and invasive effort to root out Sanger's source: because it reveals the obvious truth that the US is the leading aggressor in the world when it comes to cyber-weapons.¶This significant expansion under the Orwellian rubric of "cyber-security" is thus a perfect microcosm of US military spending generally. It's all justified under by the claim that the US must defend itself from threats from Bad, Aggressive Actors, when the reality is the exact opposite: the new program is devoted to ensuring that the US remains the primary offensive threat to the rest of the world. It's the same way the [US develops offensive biological weapons](http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/oct/29/usa.julianborger) under the guise of developing defenses against such weapons (such as the 2001 anthrax that [the US government itself says came from a US Army lab](http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/10/science/10anthrax.html?pagewanted=all)). It's how the US government generally convinces its citizens that it is a peaceful victim of aggression by others when the reality is that the US builds more weapons, sells more arms and bombs more countries than virtually the rest of the world combined.¶ Threats to privacy and internet freedom¶ Beyond the aggressive threat to other nations posed by the Pentagon's "cyber-security" programs, there is the profound threat to privacy, internet freedom, and the ability to communicate freely for US citizens and foreign nationals alike. The US government has long viewed these "cyber-security" programs as a means of monitoring and controlling the internet and disseminating propaganda. The fact that this is all being done under the auspices of the NSA and the Pentagon means, by definition, that there will be no transparency and no meaningful oversight.¶ Back in 2003, the Rumsfeld Pentagon prepared [a secret report](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/27_01_06_psyops.pdf) entitled "Information Operations (IO) Roadmap", which laid the foundation for this new cyber-warfare expansion. The Pentagon's self-described objective was "transforming IO into a core military competency on par with air, ground, maritime and special operations". In other words, its key objective was to ensure military control over internet-based communications:¶ It further identified superiority in cyber-attack capabilities as a vital military goal in PSYOPs (Psychological Operations) and "information-centric fights":¶ And it set forth the urgency of dominating the "IO battlespace" not only during wartime but also in peacetime:¶ As [a 2006 BBC report](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4655196.stm) on this Pentagon document noted: "Perhaps the most startling aspect of the roadmap is its acknowledgement that information put out as part of the military's psychological operations, or Psyops, is finding its way onto the computer and television screens of ordinary Americans." And while the report paid lip service to the need to create "boundaries" for these new IO military activities, "they don't seem to explain how." Regarding the report's plan to "provide maximum control of the entire electromagnetic spectrum", the BBC noted: "Consider that for a moment. The US military seeks the capability to knock out every telephone, every networked computer, every radar system on the planet."¶Since then, there have been countless reports of the exploitation by the US national security state to destroy privacy and undermine internet freedom. In November, [the LA Times described](http://articles.latimes.com/2012/nov/22/nation/la-na-cyber-school-20121123) programs that "teach students how to spy in cyberspace, the latest frontier in espionage." They "also are taught to write computer viruses, hack digital networks, crack passwords, plant listening devices and mine data from broken cellphones and flash drives." The program, needless to say, "has funneled most of its graduates to the CIA and the Pentagon's National Security Agency, which conducts America's digital spying. Other graduates have taken positions with the FBI, NASA and the Department of Homeland Security."¶In 2010, Lawrence E. Strickling, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information, [gave a speech](http://www.ntia.doc.gov/speechtestimony/2010/remarks-assistant-secretary-strickling-media-institute) explicitly announcing that the US intends to abandon its policy of "leaving the Internet alone". Noting that this "has been the nation's Internet policy since the Internet was first commercialized in the mid-1990s", he decreed: "This was the right policy for the United States in the early stages of the Internet, and the right message to send to the rest of the world. But that was then and this is now."¶The documented power of the US government to monitor and surveil internet communications is already unfathomably massive. Recall that the Washington Post's 2010 "Top Secret America" series [noted that](http://projects.washingtonpost.com/top-secret-america/articles/a-hidden-world-growing-beyond-control/print/): "Every day, collection systems at the National Security Agency intercept and store 1.7 billion e-mails, phone calls and other types of communications." And the Obama administration [has formally demanded](http://boingboing.net/2010/09/27/obama-administration.html) that it have access to any and all forms of internet communication.¶ It is hard to overstate the danger to privacy and internet freedom from a massive expansion of the National Security State's efforts to exploit and control the internet. As Wired'sSingel wrote back in 2010:¶ "Make no mistake, the military industrial complex now has its eye on the internet. Generals want to train crack squads of hackers and have wet dreams of cyberwarfare. Never shy of extending its power, the military industrial complex wants to turn the internet into yet another venue for an arms race".¶Wildly exaggerated cyber-threats are the pretext for this control, the "mushroom cloud" and the Tonkin Gulf fiction of cyber-warfare. As Singel aptly put it: "the only war going on is one for the soul of the internet." That's the vital context for understanding this massive expansion of Pentagon and NSA consolidated control over cyber programs.

#### They adopt this process of disassociation and distancing by surrendering themselves to the state – the affirmative distances themselves not only from their own social privileges but also disassociates themselves from complicity they have in participating in a process of separating themselves from the state structures they criticize while simultaneously embracing those same structures – this disassociation has led to some of the bloodiest atrocities in history – It conceals political apathy under the guise of activism and ensures the continuation of the problems they seek to solve – Fasching and deChant argue that

(Darrell and Dell, Prof. of Religious Studies @ University of South Florida, Prof. of Religious Studies @ USF, Comparative Religious Ethics: A Narrative Approach, Pg.  42-43)

Interpreting our own historical situation is a risky business, for we are still too close to the events. We do not have the distance needed to put everything into proper perspective. Nevertheless, without such an interpretation it is impossible to identify the ethical challenges that face us, so we must risk it. In this chapter we argue that two major trends unfolded in the twentieth century that are of significance for thinking about ethics: (1) the phenomenon of mass killing encouraged by sacred narratives that authorize "killing in order to heal," as symbolized by Auschwitz and Hiroshima, and (2) a cross-cultural and interreligious ethic of non-violent resistance or civil disobedience symbolized by figures like Gandhi and King – one that functions as an ethic of audacity on behalf of the stranger. The second, we suggest, offers an ethic of the holy in response to the sacred morality of the first. The modern period, which began with a utopian hope that science and technology would create an age of peace, prosperity, and progress, ended in an apocalyptic nightmare of mass death, symbolized by Auschwitz and Hiroshima, leaving us with the task of creating a post/modern ethic that can transcend the techno-bureaucratic tribalism that expressed itself in two world wars. Technobureaucratic tribalism occurs when sacred narratives are combined with the technical capacity to produce mass death. While we do not pretend to offer an exhaustive explanation of the modern propensity for mass death, we do suggest two key elements: (1) the use of sacred narratives that define killing as a form of healing, and (2) the undermining of ethical consciousness by techno-bureaucratic organization through a psychological process of doubling (separating one's personal and professional identities), which enables individuals to deny that they are responsible for some of their actions. Through sacred stories, the stranger is defined as less than human and therefore beyond the pale of ethical obligation, as well as a threat to sacred order. At the same time, bureaucracies encourage one to engage in a total surrender of self in unquestioning obedience to higher (sacred) authority (whether God, religious leaders, or political leaders), so that when one acts as a professional self on behalf of an institution (the state, the military, the church, etc.) one can say, "It is not I that acts: a higher authority is acting through me, so I am not personally responsible." Yet, despite the seemingly overwhelming dominance of techno- bureaucratic tribalism and mass killing in the twentieth century, a modest but important counter-trend also emerged – a cross-cultural and interreligious ethic of audacity on behalf of the stranger, linked to such names as Tolstoy, Gandhi, and King. The purpose of this chapter is to grasp the ethical challenge of modernity as symbolized by Auschwitz and Hiroshima. The purpose of the remainder of this book is to examine the potential of the ethical response to that challenge offered by the tradition of non-violent civil disobedience, symbolized by Gandhi and King, for a cross-cultural and interreligious post/modern ethic of human dignity, human rights, and human liberation

## 2nc

#### Identity, Positioning, and personal experience informing debates is inevitable and we must be accountable for our knowledge production – we should adopt methodologies that close the distance between the abstract and concrete – inter-locking systems of domination distort and warp decision-making and argument testing – our intersectional method is necessary to confront the current process of arriving at truth claims

Collins 90 (Patricia Hill, Distinguished University Professor of Sociology at the University of Maryland, College Park, Former head of the Department of African American Studies at the University of Cincinnati, and the past President of the American Sociological Association Council, *Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness and the Politics of Empowerment*, p. 62-65)

A second component of the ethic of caring concerns the appropriateness of emotions in dialogues. Emotion indicates that a speaker believes in the validity of an argument. Consider Ntozake Shange’s description of one of the goals of her work: "Our [Western] society allows people to be absolutely neurotic and totally out of touch with their feelings and everyone else’s feelings, and yet be very respectable. This, to me, is a travesty I’m trying to change the idea of seeing emotions and intellect as distinct faculties." The Black women’s blues tradition’s history of personal expressiveness heals this either/or dichotomous rift separating emotion and intellect. For example, in her rendition of "Strange Fruit," Billie Holiday’s lyrics blend seamlessly with the emotion of her delivery to render a trenchant social commentary on southern lynching. Without emotion, Aretha Franklin’s cry for "respect" would be virtually meaningless. A third component of the ethic of caring involves developing the capacity for empathy. Harriet Jones, a 16-year-old Black woman, explains to her interviewer why she chose to open up to him: "Some things in my life are so hard for me to bear, and it makes me feel better to know that you feel sorry about those things and would change them if you could." Without her belief in his empathy, she found it difficult to talk. Black women writers often explore the growth of empathy as part of an ethic of caring. For example, the growing respect that the Black slave woman Dessa and the white woman Rufel gain for one another in Sherley Anne William’s Dessa Rose stems from their increased understanding of each other’s positions. After watching Rufel fight off the advances of a white man, Dessa lay awake thinking: "The white woman was subject to the same ravishment as me; this the thought that kept me awake. I hadn’t knowed white mens could use a white woman like that, just take her by force same as they could with us." As a result of her newfound empathy, Dessa observed, "it was like we had a secret between us." These components of the ethic of caring: the value placed on individual expressiveness, the appropriateness of emotions, and the capacity for empathy-pervade African-American culture. One of the best examples of the interactive nature of the importance of dialogue and the ethic of caring in assessing knowledge claims occurs in the use of the call-and-response discourse mode in traditional Black church services. In such services both the minister and the congregation routinely use voice rhythm and vocal inflection to convey meaning. The sound of what is being said is just as important as the words themselves in what is, in a sense, a dialogue of reason and emotion. As a result it is nearly impossible to filter out the strictly linguistic-cognitive abstract meaning from the sociocultural psychoemotive meaning. While the ideas presented by a speaker must have validity (i.e., agree with the general body of knowledge shared by the Black congregation), the group also appraises the way knowledge claims are presented. There is growing evidence that the ethic of caring may be part of women’s experience as well. Certain dimensions of women’s ways of knowing bear striking resemblance to Afrocentric expressions of the ethic of caring. Belenky et al. point out that two contrasting epistemological orientations characterize knowing: one an epistemology of separation based on impersonal procedures for establishing truth and the other, an epistemology of connection in which truth emerges through care. While these ways of knowing are not gender specific, disproportionate numbers of women rely on connected knowing. The emphasis placed on expressiveness and emotion in African-American communities bears marked resemblance to feminist perspectives on the importance of personality in connected knowing. Separate knowers try to subtract the personality of an individual from his or her ideas because they see personality as biasing those ideas. In contrast, connected knowers see personality as adding to an individual’s ideas and feel that the personality of each group member enriches a group’s understanding. The significance of individual uniqueness, personal expressiveness, and empathy in African-American communities thus resembles the importance that some feminist analyses place on women’s "inner voice." The convergence of Afrocentric and feminist values in the ethic of caring seems particularly acute. White women may have access to a women’s tradition valuing emotion and expressiveness, but few Eurocentric institutions except the family validate this way of knowing. In contrast, Black women have long had the support of the Black church, an institution with deep roots in the African past and a philosophy that accepts and encourages expressiveness and an ethic of caring. Black men share in this Afrocentric tradition. But they must resolve the contradictions that confront them in searching for Afrocentric models of masculinity in the face of abstract, unemotional notions of masculinity imposed on them. The differences among race/gender groups thus hinge on differences in their access to institutional supports valuing one type of knowing over another. Although Black women may be denigrated within white-male-controlled academic institutions, other institutions, such as Black families and churches, which encourage the expression of Black female power, seem to do so, in part, by way of their support for an Afrocentric feminist epistemology. The Ethic of Personal Accountability An ethic of personal accountability is the final dimension of an alternative epistemology. Not only must individuals develop their knowledge claims through dialogue and present them in a style proving their concern for their ideas, but people are expected to be accountable for their knowledge claims. Zilpha Elaw’s description of slavery reflects this notion that every idea has an owner and that the owner’s identity matters: "Oh, the abominations of slavery! ... Every case of slavery, however lenient its infliction and mitigated its atrocities, indicates an oppressor, the oppressed, and oppression." For Elaw abstract definitions of slavery mesh with the concrete identities of its perpetrators and its victims. African-Americans consider it essential for individuals to have personal positions on issues and assume full responsibility for arguing their validity. Assessments of an individual’s knowledge claims simultaneously evaluate an individual’s character, values, and ethics. African-Americans reject **the Eurocentric, masculinist belief that probing into an individual’s personal viewpoint is** outside the boundaries of discussion. Rather, all views expressed and actions taken are thought to derive from a central set of core beliefs that cannot be other than personal. "Does Aretha really believe that Black women should get ‘respect, or is she just mouthing the words?" is a valid question in an Afrocentric feminist epistemology. Knowledge claims made by individuals respected for their moral and ethical connections to their ideas will carry more weight than those offered by less respected figures. An example drawn from an undergraduate course composed entirely of Black women which I taught might help to clarify the uniqueness of this portion of the knowledge validation process. During one class discussion I asked the students to evaluate a prominent Black male scholar’s analysis of Black feminism. Instead of severing the scholar from his context in order to dissect the rationality of his thesis, my students demanded facts about the author’s personal biography. They were especially interested in concrete details of his life, such as his relationships with Black women, his marital status, and his social class background. By requesting data on dimensions of his personal life routinely excluded in positivist approaches to knowledge validation, they invoked concrete experience as a criterion of meaning. They used this information to assess whether he really cared about his topic and drew on this ethic of caring in advancing their knowledge claims about his work. Furthermore, they refused to evaluate the rationality of his written ideas without some indication of his personal credibility as an ethical human being. The entire exchange could only have occurred as a dialogue among members of a class that had established a solid enough community to employ an alternative epistemology in assessing knowledge claims. The ethic of personal accountability is clearly an Afrocentric value, but is it feminist as well? While limited by its attention to middle-class, white women, Carol Gilligan’s work suggests that there is a female model for moral development whereby women are more inclined to link morality to responsibility, relationships, and the ability to maintain social ties. If this is the case, then African-American women again experience a convergence of values from Afrocentric and female institutions. The use of an Afrocentric feminist epistemology in traditional Black church services illustrates the interactive nature of all four dimensions and also serves as a metaphor for the distinguishing features of an Afrocentric feminist way of knowing. The services represent more than dialogues between the rationality used in examining bible texts and stories and the emotion inherent in the use of reason for this purpose. The rationale for such dialogues involves the task of examining concrete experiences for the presence of an ethic of caring. Neither emotion nor ethics is subordinated to reason. Instead, emotion, ethics, and reason are used as interconnected, essential components in assessing knowledge claims. In an Afrocentric feminist epistemology, values lie at the heart of the knowledge validation process such that inquiry always has an ethical aim. Alternative knowledge claims in and of themselves are rarely threatening to conventional knowledge. Such claims are routinely **ignored, discredited, or simply absorbed and marginalized in existing paradigms**, Much more threatening is the challenge that alternative epistemologies offer to he basic process used by the powerful to legitimate their knowledge claims. If the epistemology used to validate knowledge comes into question, then all prior knowledge claims validated under the dominant model become suspect. An alternative epistemology challenges all certified knowledge and opens up the question of whether what has been taken to be true can stand the test of alternative ways of validating truth. The existence of a self-defined Black women’s standpoint using an Afrocentric feminist epistemology calls into question the content of what currently passes as truth and simultaneously challenges the process of arriving at the truth.

#### The 1ACs self-glorification is a pat-on-the-back that reinscribes distancing – being privileged is never in one’s control but it’s a choice what to do with one’s privilege – undoing privilege is a never-ending process that is key to accountability beyond the single act of the 1AC

Yancy 8 (George, Prof of Philosophy at Duquesne University, *Black bodies, white gazes : the continuing significance of race*, p. 229)

As has been argued throughout this book, whiteness is a powerful embodied form of being-in-the-world, where "ignorance of white domination is not just an empty gap in knowledge nor the product of a mere epistemological oversight."lo One might say that being a white antiracist is **never completely in one's control** because such an identity is deferred by the sheer complexity of the fact that one is never self-transparent, that one is **ensconced within structural and material power racial hierarchies**, that the white body is constituted by **racist habits** that create a form of racist **inertia** even as the white body attempts to undermine its somatic normativity, and that the white self undergoes processes of inter- pellation even as the white self engages in agential acts of racist disruption. This does not mean, though, that all is hopeless or, as one white student commented, that "since racism is so powerful that we [whites] just might as well be racists." One ought to exercise vigilance and DuBoisian "long siege" even while complicity with whiteness is still possible or precisely because one is always already complicit with whiteness. Comedian Michael Richards (known as the character "Cosmo Kramer" on the sitcom Seinfeld) may not have realized the significance of his insight when he attempted a televised apology for his explosive racist tirade at the Laugh Factory in 2006. Pointing to a group of Blacks in the audience who allegedly had been talking during his performance, with a great deal of anger and vitriol he shouted: "Shut-up. Fifty years ago, we'd have you upside down with a fucking fork up your ass. You can talk, you can talk, you can talk. You brave now motherfucka. Throw his ass out, he's a nigger! He's a nigger! He's a nigger! A nigger, look it's a nigger!" After this tirade, people actually began to leave the show. On his way out, one of the Black men shouted back at Richards, saying how unfair it was that he used such language. Richards responded, "That's what happens when you interrupt a white man, don't you know?,,11 Particularly revealing about Richards's language is his reference to the spectacle of lynching Black male bodies with themes of unashamed sodomy, in this case with a fork. Moreover, as a white man, he marked his identity as a site of threatening power over and against the inferior, uncultured, and disruptive identity of the "nigger." . In short, to interrupt a white man, to look a white man in the eyes, to disagree with a white man, is to forget one's place in the natural scheme of things. To think that you are more than a "nigger" requires some reminding. Richards asked, "Don't you know?" His question reminded the "niggers" in the audience that they should have known better than to interfere with a white man, whose voice and presence are sacrosanct and hegemonic. Richards used the "n-word" six times, seven if you include where he pronounced it "nigga." Later, he appeared via satellite on the Dave Letterman Show (with Jerry Seinfeld on th show) and offered an apology, saying "I'm not a racist. That's what's so insane about this." How does one reconcile his understanding of himself as not a racist in the light of his blatant racism? Insightfully, he adds, "And yet, it's said. It comes through. It fires out ofme.,,12 Richards could be lying about not being a racist in order to redeem his image. In short, he simply got caught. My sense though is that· he was am- bushed. Even as he thinks he is not a racist-perhaps because he has Black friends and other "friends of color" and does not use the notorious "n-word" on a daily basis, and because he does not identify as a skinhead or associate with Klan groups-his remarks belied his self-understanding. In fact, he may see himself as a "good white." Being a good white, however, does not mean that one has arrived. In fact, being antiracist does not mean that the white self has arrived. There are many good whites who continue to participate in **structures of racial power** from which they benefit, who fear for their lives while walking down the street with Black young men walking in their direction, and who have conniptions when their young daughters (and sons) bring home "persons of color" as potential dates. For many, embedded within the construction of the notion of the "good white" and the antiracist white is the sense of stasis and self-glorification. This form of self-understanding actually obstructs the necessary deeper critical work required to unearth the various ways in which one is actually complicit in terms of racist behavior. Monique Roelofs echoes this point when she is suspicious of "a supposedly achieved 'insightful,' 'sophisticated,' 'cool,' 'courageous,' 'humorous,' 'morally remediable,' 'humane' whiteness." She worries "about the capacities of self-aestheticization to pass off my whiteness as more critical than it can be.',13 . Dismantling whiteness is a continuous project. As Clevis Headley writes, the suspension of whiteness "must come in the form of a continuously affirmed refusal to prolong the ontological and existential project of whiteness.,,14 John Warren notes that even as he attempts to perform whiteness differently, he "can- not rest under the banner of the transformed."ls He realizes he cannot escape whiteness, nor can he discount the various ways in which he actually reproduces and reinscribes whiteness. Similarly, Lisa Heldke notes, "Expanding responsibility involves recognizing that over-privilege takes everlastingly new forms, requiring traitors [to whiteness] constantly to reinvent themselves.',16 And as Alison Bailey writes, "It is a mistake to think that becoming traitorous is tantamount to completely overcoming racism.',I7 This, however, is the ambiguous reality of white racism. Antiracist whites must not flee this ambiguity, but continue to undo white racism even as it repositions them as privileged. The dis- course of "undoing" whiteness, as used here, does not mean that one is capable of undoing whiteness as one might remove one's shirt. Whiteness is not a flimsy category such that one can simply decide to cast it aside. In other words, while "undoing" whiteness is clearly a performative metaphor, it does not presuppose an ontology of the self that is capable, through a single act of will and intention, fails to comprehend how his own self-understanding is incongruent with the subtlety of his racist performance. This, again, speaks to the false notion that the self is completely in control of its own meanings and the contexts within which it is located. My guess is that Richards would not have gone into a long and vicious tirade had the persons talking in the audience been white women/men. And if he had, his racism would have· gone undetected. Examples such as the Richards case ought to force antiracist whites who fight for social justice to interrogate the sedimentation of their own racism. Furthennore, the Richards example should force antiracist whites to admit that their efforts are always incomplete, particularly as the dynamics of self-in-context are not transparent and/or simply a case of willful management. It is one thing to remain in the company of whites and proclaim oneself an antiracist. It is another to throw oneself in the social fray where people of color move and have their being. It is within such lived social spaces of transacting with Black bodies, for example, that one's commitment to antiracist praxis is tested. It is so easy to hide behind antiracist rhetoric when one limits oneself to predictable social encounters that are already predicated upon social transactions that do not challenge or complicate the white self. However, in social transactions that do challenge the white self, conditions obtain that are ripe for ambush. As Richards warns, "That's what happens when you interrupt a white man, don't you know?" While being ambushed by one's whiteness can occur in the absence of people of color, as when one deems oneself an antiracist white and yet laughs hysterically at a racist joke while bonding with one's white friends, actually transacting with flesh and blood bodies of color can function as a powerful catalyst that can trigger an ambush. "You're a prolific Black philosopher." And yet, there is the mantra: "I'm not a racist. That's what's so insane about this.